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A new perspective on self-deception for applied purposes 
Tatiana Bachkirova, Oxford Brookes University, UK 
 
Abstract 
 
The concept of self-deception atracts the atention of many fields of knowledge, 
however very few atempts have been made to compare and contrast these positions 
for applied purposes. This paper provides theoretical analysis of the literature on self-
deception from a pragmatic perspective that informs personal development work on 
recognizing and minimizing self-deception and helping practices such as counseling 
and coaching. Five distinct strands of thought on self-deception are identified and 
discussed with their implications for personal development work revealing significant 
diversity in the views on self-deception. The paper suggests that what is missing in 
curent theories of self-deception is consideration of self in self-deceivers. In 
conjunction with theories of adult development this paper suggests a new 
developmental perspective on self-deception that highlights individual diferences 
according to developmental stages providing a unique contribution to curent debates 
about the concept and potential approaches for influencing self-deception. From the 
pragmatic perspective the paper also proposes a synthesis of the discussed theoretical 
perspectives in the form of a conceptual model that demonstrates the complexity and 
multidimensionality of self-deception. 
 
Keywords: self-deception, pragmatic perspective, self, developmental perspective, 
helping practices 
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The concept of self-deception has a long history in psychology and philosophy and 
continues to inspire new perspectives and explanations of the paradox that it entails. The 
idea that the mind can conceal information from itself is puzzling and disturbing, 
producing diferent conceptions of self-deception and diferent views on the 
consequences of it. For Pinker (2008), for example, documenting the human propensity 
to self-deception and similar phenomena is one of the greatest achievements in 
psychology because they are “the source of much of the complexity, and tragedy, of 
human life" (Pinker, 2008, p. 184). Others support the studies of self-deception but argue 
that a degree of it is always present and may even be beneficial not only for individuals 
but for the survival of species (e.g. Rorty, 1994; Von Hippel and Trivers, 2011). There 
are also those who simply reject the idea of the existence of this phenomenon (e.g. 
Gergen, 1985). The implications of such positions for everyday living, welbeing and 
human development may difer significantly. However, few atempts have been made to 
compare these positions and explore them for applied purposes (Fingarete, 2000). 
It is interesting that in the history of human thought self-deception was initialy 
explored with a view to finding a way to overcome it. In the existential philosophy of 
Sartre (1956) self-deception was discussed as ‘bad faith’. It was seen as a refusal to reflect 
and to take responsibility for the engagements with the world which were apparent, but the 
person would not recognize them as his/her own. The intention to live authenticaly, Sartre 
argued, could help to defeat ‘bad faith’ through disciplined self-analysis. In the legacy of 
Freud (1923/1962), the concepts of unconscious defense mechanisms, although associated 
mainly with pathology, also had to be uncovered in psychoanalysis for the benefit of the 
client who was engaged in self-deception as a strategy of dealing with anxiety. However, 
more recent literature, although expanding the aray of explanations of self-deception, has 
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seemingly lost interest in this pragmatic aim: to understand this phenomenon in order to 
minimize it or live with it. 
What becomes fairly transparent in comparing significantly diferent curent 
conceptualizations of self-deception is that the diferences and similarities between them 
are associated with diferent positions on the self, which in some cases are clearly stated 
and in others are implicit. Although the variety of these positions is not surprising given the 
spectrum of perspectives on the self, each of their proponents are able to provide 
supporting evidence from various research studies, however limited. This might mean that 
much of the empirical data may be interpreted according to the position taken, or that many 
perspectives on self-deception can have valid points. In this case, the value of such 
diversity could be utilized from a pragmatic perspective. 
The paper wil begin with an examination of the concept of self-deception and the 
paradoxes it entails in order to establish the nature of the problem that it aims to address. 
The second part of the paper wil discuss a range of distinct perspectives on self-deception 
in terms of their explicit or potential implications for individuals who do not wish to 
deceive themselves and for professionals who assist individuals in their quest for 
development and/or welbeing. Although a significant diversity in viewing self-deception 
wil be highlighted the aim wil not be to solve the conundrum that self-deception presents 
but to point out how it has arisen in broad terms. 
In the third part of the paper it wil be argued that al of the presented traditions are 
missing an important perspective – the self of the self-deceiver. With the focus on the self 
an additional theoretical position on self-deception is proposed. I wil argue that this 
developmental perspective on self-deception provides a unique approach to unresolved 
conceptual issues and leads to important implications for practice. The pragmatic stance of 
the paper alows for integration of the discussed positions of self-deception into a meta-
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model that reflects the complexity of this phenomenon and the value inherent in the rich 
diversity of the existing perspectives. 
1.  Understanding self-deception 
Much of the debate in the literature is about defining the necessary and suficient 
conditions for self-deception and diferentiating self-deception from other concepts, such as 
wishful thinking, self-serving bias, cognitive dissonance or defense mechanisms of the ego 
(e.g. Fingarete, 2000; Rorty, 1994; Mele, 2001). It is recognized, for example, that self-
deception is not the same as biased information processing or erors in logic, which are 
sometimes presented as self-deception. 
1) The first condition that suggests self-deception is present is holding a belief that 
contradicts the information/knowledge that the individual possesses at the same time 
(Demos, 1960). However, this is not a suficient condition: we filter information for many 
diferent reasons and can hold inconsistent beliefs without noticing this. This could be 
simply ignorance rather than self-deception. 2) To be considered as self-deception many 
authors claim that this belief should be persistent and 3) that the person should be 
motivated to keep it (Gur & Sackeim, 1979; Fingarete, 2000). 4) In addition the individual 
should be active: “acting in ways that keep one uninformed about unwanted information” 
(Bandura, 2011, p.16). Moreover, Lewis (1996) observes that in the literature “the 
deception is always manifest in what is articulated, while unacknowledged (not-p) is that 
which is veritable and pure” (pp. 51-52) – the view that led him to defend a diferent 
explanation of self-deception. 
It is important to notice that traditional explanations of self-deception are modeled 
on intentional other-deception (e.g. Davidson, 1985) – a premise that led to useful 
questions, but also to paradoxes that had to be addressed. Mele (2001) described these 
paradoxes as static and dynamic puzzles. The static puzzle is about how the self can be 
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both aware and not aware of p at the same time. The dynamic puzzle is about intentionality: 
if self-deception is intentional and strategic how can it fail in undermining itself? The 
agent’s knowledge of what they are up to should get in the way. But if it is not intentional 
how do they succeed? One of the typical approaches in the literature to address these 
paradoxes is temporal or psychological partitioning that separates two opposing beliefs in 
terms of the time of experiencing or via a divided model of self/consciousness (Clegg & 
Moissinac, 2005). 
The partitioning approach to self-deception addresses the static paradox by dividing 
the agent into two or more sub-agents. Each of them can hold incompatible beliefs. The 
dynamic paradox is resolved by postulating that the deceived sub-agent cannot access the 
deceiving sub-agent’s activities (Marafa, 2012). Freud (1930/2002), for example, was not 
only the first partitionist, but someone who significantly influenced the persistent view on 
self-deception and self, which is based on the dominant role of consciousness in human 
engagement with the world. However, it is only now in the philosophical literature that a 
shift can be noticed from seeing self-deception as a temporary impairment of normal belief-
forming processes (a position associated with more prominent role of introspective 
consciousness) to the more naturalistic and accepting view of self-deception as a natural 
inclination of the human mind, a property inherent to belief-formation mechanisms (Rorty, 
1994; Bayne and Fernández, 2009; Marafa, 2012). This shift was clearly fueled by 
findings in neuroscience that advocate that the working of the brain and mind are more 
modular and unconscious (e.g. Gazzaniga, 1992; Martindale, 1980). 
Modularity suggests that the mind consists of a large number of functionaly 
specialized goal-oriented programs that can be isolated from one another. It provides an 
explanation of cases in which two mutualy inconsistent representations coexist within the 
same mind. With this modular view, the co-existence of mutualy inconsistent 
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representations presents no dificulties as a result of informational encapsulation (Fodor, 
1983; Baret, 2005; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Kurzban, 2011). As Pinker (1997) said, 
“the truth is useful, so it should be registered somewhere in the mind, waled of from the 
parts that interact with other people” (p. 421). This means that in a modular self, self-
deception is strategic. Both conscious and non-conscious goals, once taking a center stage, 
“exert temporary downstream efects upon the individual’s information processing and 
behaviors in ways that facilitate successful pursuit of that goal” (Huang & Bargh, 2011, p. 
27; Kenrick & White, 2011; Martindale, 1980). These modular systems are not deceiving 
each other - they are simply operating with a certain degree of autonomy. Some authors 
speculate that self-deception may be a natural consequence of the autonomous goal 
operation that characterized our pre-conscious past (Kurzban, 2011; Huang & Bargh, 
2011). 
The idea of partitioning is arguably supported by empirical studies that suggest that 
by acting independently subsystems can produce outcomes that may be considered 
deceptive. For example, it was shown that when the goal (need) is active, people perceive 
goal-factual stimuli as bigger, closer and more likable (Veltkamp et al, 2008; Balcetis & 
Dunning, 2010; Ferguson, 2008; Bruner & Goodman 1947). It could be postulated then that 
when the need is satisfied activation stops inhibiting mental representations involved in 
pursuit of the goal and memory brings back the images that support other goals. The person 
experiences this as the realization of what was ‘known’ long before but for a while was 
‘covered’ by self-deception. 
When self-deception is associated with nuances of information processing, various 
atempts are made to describe mechanisms of its occurence. Von Hippel and Trivers 
(2011) make a case for classification of mechanisms of self-deception as employed at 
diferent stages of information processing. For example, at the stage of information 
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gathering self-deception is manifested in selected atention, e.g. biased information search 
(amount of search, selective searching and selective atention) and typical biased 
interpretation. For example, we take credit for successes but deny blame for failures 
(Zuckerman, 1984), accept praise uncriticaly but receive criticism skepticaly, looking for 
a reason to dismiss it (Kunda, 1990). At the middle stage of information processing self-
deception is sustained by obfuscating the truth and misremembering. For example, Conway 
and Ross (1984) demonstrated that after taking a study skils class, people misremembered 
their prior study skils as lower than they had rated them originaly, thereby supporting 
their belief that their skils have improved (Von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). Other studies 
show that we can persuade ourselves that our good traits are exceptional while our flaws 
are common and shared by many other people (Campbel, 1986; Suls & Wan, 1987). There 
are also many ways of convincing the self in a particular narative amongst possible others 
(Lewis, 1996; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004) which in other traditions is caled 
rationalization. 
There is broad agreement in the literature that for self-deception to be a consistent 
strategy and an enduring capacity of individuals, there should be a gain in deceiving 
oneself. On a personal scale the gain is usualy about avoiding distress and/or acquiring 
benefits such as enhanced self-image. Some authors make more emphasis on the avoidance 
strategy (Freud, 1938/1950; Fingarete, 2000; Sackeim, 1983), other focus on the role of 
gained benefits with more variations as to what the nature of these benefits is (Starek & 
Keating, 1991; Campbel, 1986; Suls & Wan, 1987). On the other hand, other authors, e.g. 
Von Hippel and Trivers (2011) argue against the traditional view on self-deception as a 
defensive strategy with hedonic consequences. They suggest that the strategy of self-
deception is ofensive rather than defensive. Hedonic interests are only a means to an end. 
According to these authors, self-deception has developed to beter conceal deception and so 
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the main benefit of self-deception is performance enhancement. When someone 
experiences a doubt or lack of self-belief, deception of others in one’s abilities is more 
convincing if accompanied by self-deception. In this case it is less likely that deception wil 
be uncovered. Von Hippel and Trivers (2011) provide many examples of such benefits 
claiming that this strategy provides individuals with personal and evolutionary advantages, 
also claiming that self-deception enhances immune function and leads to greater 
interpersonal success. In support of this view Kenrick and White (2011, p. 29) argue that 
any “functional explanation cannot begin and end inside a person’s head – people do not 
strive to “feel good” for its own sake, they feel good when they act in ways that, on 
average, increased their ancestors’ chances of survival and reproduction”. 
Alongside the potential benefits of self-deception there are discussions about the 
various costs of self-deception, not only for a self-deceiving individual but also for others 
involved. The first warning about the cost of self-deception could be traced back to Freud 
(1938/1950) who said that the penalty for repression is repetition. For many other authors 
(e.g. Funder, 2011; Preti & Mioto, 2006), including Von Hippel and Trivers (2011), the 
loss of information integrity seems to be the main cost of self-deception. Considering that 
commitment to reality and honesty is important in perception and in communication, self-
deception can be efective when it represents smal and believable deviations from reality. 
In this regard Von Hippel and Trivers (2011, p. 43) go as far as even suggesting that a wel-
tuned self-deceptive organism would likely be one that biases reality by 20% in the favored 
direction proportionaly to 80% of self-verification strivings. 
1.1. Themes from the applied research 
In comparison to the above themes in the literature that are widely discussed, what atracts 
much less atention but is of interest for a pragmatist are individual diferences in terms of 
the tendency for self-deception and the ways of influencing it. There are studies in 
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psychology that define self-deception as a dispositional tendency to have an unrealisticaly 
positive self-image (Sackheim, 1983) claiming that it is a global stable trait (Lee & Klein, 
2002). They measure self-deception on, for example, a 20-items Self-Deception scale of 
Paulhus’ Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR, Version 6, Paulhus, 1991). 
Although such measures might be valuable in assessing the degree of individual tendencies, 
the claim of stability of these tendencies in al circumstances is questionable and makes 
litle contribution to the interests of those who wish to change or influence these 
tendencies.  
In the psychoanalytical literature (Vailant, 1992) a range of empirical studies, 
including longitudinal, show that the nature of defense mechanisms changes throughout the 
life time of an individual. The spectrum of change begins from pathology and immature 
defenses (e.g. denial, projection and acting out) moving gradualy to more mature defenses 
such as suppression, sublimation and humor (Vailant, 1992, pp. 96-97). Similar findings 
are documented in the field of adult development (Loevinger, 1976; Kegan, 1982, 1994; 
Cook-Greuter, 1999). Although these findings are significant in ilustrating the opportunity 
for self-deception to change they indicate only initial steps towards understanding how 
self-deception can be minimized or whether influencing self-deception is possible at al. 
There is at the same time an area of applied philosophy in the educational literature 
that is concerned with self-deception: teaching critical thinking. Whisner (1993) for 
example, suggests several educational strategies to overcome the tendency of students to 
engage in rationalization and self-deception. However, it appears that Whisner equates self-
deception with persistent beliefs and aims to improve appraisal skils and to address so-
caled motivational deficiencies mainly by engaging students in ‘corect reasoning’ (1993, 
p. 310). Apart from overestimating the power of reasoning in self-deception, his strategy of 
appealing to students’ moral convictions seems highly questionable. 
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In the psychotherapeutic literature, other than already mentioned studies of defense 
mechanisms, self-deception in clients is also addressed under the umbrela of irational 
beliefs in REBT (rational emotive behavior therapy) (Elis, 1994). Irational beliefs are 
identified and chalenged in a similar way to critical thinking approaches by the use of 
reasoning. In other traditions defensiveness is considered as a sign of underlying anxiety or 
unacknowledged desires which may be influenced by the client-therapist’s relationships or 
the psychotherapeutic process (Kirby, 2003; Cooper, 2005; Westland and Shinebourne, 
2009). In most cases self-deception is used to describe maladaptive atitudes and behaviors 
that are identified by the therapist as an expert. However, Spineli (2007) argues that not al 
branches of psychotherapy are the same in this respect. Narative, social constructionists 
and existential psychotherapists avoid assuming an expert role and judging clients’ stories 
as unreal, irational or false. 
Some emerging interests in self-deception can also be noticed in coaching literature 
(Berglas, 2002; Wiliams et al, 2010) with a focus on ‘faulty thinking’ and ‘self-limiting 
beliefs’. The authors tend to apply strategies similar to critical thinking methods or some 
ideas from cognitive-behavioral therapy, treading carefuly not to overstep the boundaries 
with counseling or psychotherapy. At the same time as coaching practitioners tend to 
position themselves closer to applied positive psychology rather than the psychotherapeutic 
field, it would seem unusual for coaches to work explicitly with self-deception when the 
expectation is to focus on strengths (Kaufman et al, 2010; Freire, 2013). Only 
developmental coaching ofers some inclination to address self-deception explicitly 
(Bachkirova, 2011, 2013), but such approaches are in the early stages of development. 
It seems therefore that literature on self-deception is mainly concerned with the 
understanding of the phenomenon of self-deception but much less with the implications of 
the new theories proposed and conceptual advances made. In the fields of applied 
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knowledge, on the other hand, there are some atempts in addressing the topic of self-
deception but without consideration of the recent theories and debates. Consequently, litle 
curent theoretical influence can be noticed on applied approaches of working with 
individuals who want to minimize self-deception. In the folowing section potential 
implications of some distinct theoretical positions on self-deception are speculatively 
considered. 
2.  Perspectives on self-deception and their implications for practice 
Five distinct perspectives on self-deception are described: 1) Existential philosophy; 2) the 
psychoanalytic approach; 3) postmodernism; 4) the evolutionary approach and 5) the 
neuroscience position. For consistency, presentation of each perspective wil include: a) a 
concept of self-deception as conceived within this perspective; b) an actual or deduced 
view on minimizing self-deception with the opportunity of influencing it and c) potential 
problems with this approach. 
2.1.  In Existential philosophy self-deception is seen as puting oneself to sleep in one 
particular respect (Sartre, 1956). It is a disavowal of responsibility for some project of 
consciousness by refusal to reflect upon it. The self-deceiver seems to be at war with 
his/her self. 
“It is from this perspective, so insistently favored by Sartre and other Existentialists 
that we see how someone, by reason of lack of spiritual courage, atempts to save his 
integrity at a price which amounts to surrendering, however indirectly, the very 
integrity that he cherishes” (Fingarete, 2000, p. 138).   
Although, according to Sartre, accepting the anguish ofers a possibility of acting in good 
faith, the expectation of change for the self-deceiver is often excessively strong and 
demanding in moral terms. The self-deceiver must accept his lack of moral courage and 
take responsibility for his engagement with the world that he does not dare to accept as his. 
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Although Whisner (1993) does not present himself as an existentialist, the demand for 
honesty and appeal to moral values in his practical approach to eliminating self-deception 
seems to be similar to the message of existentialists. Apart from the development of 
thinking skils the self-deceiver has to be conveyed the message that “…rationalization and 
self-deception are incompatible with the belief that he or she is a moraly good person” 
(1993, p. 320). 
However, the role of consciousness and intelect seems overstated in the influencing 
of self-deception, in exactly the same way as the role of the intelectual understanding of 
psychological problems is overstated as a means of overcoming them (Claxton, 1997). 
Many therapeutic approaches, such as Gestalt (Perls, et al, 1951) show that understanding 
the problem by suferers does not guarantee the ability to change. Fingarete (2000) adds to 
this critique another plausible argument: as it is only a person who has integrity that cares 
to self-deceive, then the appeals to integrity and moral concerns can only strengthen self-
deception. 
2.2.  In the psychoanalytic approach defense mechanisms are defined as mental 
processes that operate unconsciously to reduce painful emotions. Self-deception is seen as a 
defense against anxiety – actively resisting becoming conscious of a threat, tampering with 
reality to avoid pain (Freud, 1938/1950; Maze & Henry, 1996). This tradition suggests the 
significant if not prevalent role of unconscious in the explanation of self-deception. This 
tradition is also of high interest to the pragmatist because it has a developed practice of 
working with individuals. It implies significant compassion to the self-deceiving 
individual, because self-deception is seen as a response to anxiety originating in early 
psychological trauma. The process of therapy requires re-learning through which the client 
re-evaluates the threatening situation within the context of significant transference 
relationship. 
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There is obviously something to learn about influencing self-deception from the 
psychoanalytic tradition if the roots of self-deception are in the unconscious and the deep 
painful areas of the suppressed past. It is certainly important to remember a general rule of 
this type of work to go to the limit of one’s courage, but not beyond the breaking point. 
However, defense mechanisms as studied in psychoanalysis represent only some types of 
self-deception whereas other types, as the literature shows, are about a gain rather than 
protection from anxiety. Similarly, the notion of the unconscious as dark and dangerous is 
convincingly chalenged by more curent explanations of human nature (e.g. Claxton, 2005, 
2006). It is possible that a lighter and even more appreciative atitude to the unconscious is 
more beneficial for influencing self-deception. 
2.3.  In Postmodernism the idea of self-deception is questioned in principle in the 
process of deconstructing what is meant by the self. As for self-deception, narative is a 
fundamental organizing principle for al human thought and self-deception is simply a 
special case of storyteling. As the mind can only entertain one story at a time “…al that is 
required not be aware of something is immersion in a story where that something does not 
exist” (Lewis, 1996, p. 60). 
What can be infered from this position that it is impossible to distinguish self-
deceiver from self-non-deceiver in objective terms. Self-deception is intriguing not because 
of mysterious workings of the mind, but rather because of what it says about the culture in 
which we live. The discrepancies between diferent stories presented by the individual may 
indicate what in other traditions is caled self-deception. However, the way it can be 
understood and addressed during for example narative therapy or coaching, is by exploring 
social context of these stories, such as a history of social interaction, social roles of 
individuals and discourses that influence them. 
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Although this position justifiably questions the role of an independent observer in 
defining self-deception and highlights underestimation of the role of context in these 
debates, it seems to be diminishing the role of individuals themselves in the process of 
shifting emphasis to the role of context. For example, it does not explain why individuals 
themselves can recognize their self-deceptions and why they have preferences for seeing 
things more clearly if they can help it. There is also evidence to suggest that not only the 
nature of stories changes as individuals develop, but individuals at the later stages of 
development pay more atention to self-deception and recognize it faster (Cook-Greuter, 
1999; Loevinger, 1976). However, the main problem for a pragmatist who wishes to 
influence self-deception is that the postmodernist position does not ofer much in terms of 
ways to learn and change. 
2.4.  The evolutionary approach is another distinct position to explaining self-
deception from a wider social angle (Von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). This explanation is 
radicaly diferent from others as it focuses on the benefits and adaptive value of self-
deception, suggesting that the strategy of self-deception is ofensive rather than defensive. 
Self-deception is used to beter conceal deception about one’s qualities. According to Von 
Hippel and Trivers (2011) self-enhancement is not just feeling beter about oneself, but for 
convincing others that the self is beter than it realy is, because beter selves reach 
leadership positions, have mates, etc. There is research supporting the claim that self-
deception can contribute to the long-term welbeing of individuals. In their work with adult 
bereavement Bonanno and Siddique (1999, p. 260) found that 'self-deception and 
emotional avoidance were consistently and robustly linked to a beter outcome' in terms of 
welbeing over time. 
An obvious implication of this position seems to be the opposite to the original 
intention of this paper. If self-deception is useful there is no need to be concerned with 
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minimizing it in principle. Only the balance maters and the logic of this balance is to 
become a “wel-tuned self-deceptive organism”, because “self-deception wil be most 
efective when it represents smal and believable deviations from reality (Von Hippel and 
Trivers, 2011, p. 43). This is strikingly diferent to other views on self-deception and may 
not fit with the way many people would wish to see themselves. Although it is dificult to 
argue with a position that “natural selection does not care about truth; it cares only about 
reproductive success” (Stich, 1990, p. 62), the strength of this position might only be 
applicable to the reproductive period of an individual's life. Given that we now live far 
beyond the stage where reproductive needs dominate how we wish to present our selves, it 
is a moot point as to how far such adaptive functions remain influential. In fact, some 
studies show that with more awareness and self-insight people wish to deceive themselves 
less (Cook-Greuter, 1999). 
2.5.  Finaly, it is possible to discern another position on self-deception suggested by 
some neuroscientists (Kenrick & White, 2011; Kurzban, 2011). For example, Kenrick and 
White (2011) argue that there is no self to be deceived and no deception or self-deception – 
it is simply a division of labor between diferent information-processing and motivational 
modules that are specialized to perform certain functions – ‘subselves’, according to 
Martindale (1980). One part of the mind is not “deceiving” another part; these modular 
systems are simply operating with a certain degree of autonomy. 
Although this position is wel supported and makes sense, the implications for working 
with self-deception are unknown: how can one influence what does not seem to exist? It 
might not be the task of neuroscientists to respond to the needs of those who wish to 
minimize self-deception; however, there are many questions for this position that can be 
posed by the pragmatists. For example, which subself has an awareness of another subself 
when self-deception is identified by the person? Why does the nature of defense 
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mechanisms change (Vailant, 1992, pp. 96-97)? How is change possible at al? What 
changes in the subself with increased awareness of the individual? Which subself benefits 
from increased awareness and development? 
2.6.  An overview of the problem: 
The comparative overview that is provided by this particular selection of difering 
approaches to understanding self-deception show that, whilst there are some similarities, 
the diferences are highly significant. This confirms the complex nature of dealing with the 
phenomenon for those who experience it as a problem and wish to learn about it in order to 
change their tendency towards self-deception. Some of the diferences in the 
conceptualization of self-deception are the consequence of the implicit ontological and 
epistemological assumptions that the authors make in their discussions of self-deception 
which can leave the definitions and explanations that they provide open to considerable 
misunderstanding. For example, Lewis (1996, p. 52) asks: if only one of the contradictory 
beliefs in self-deception is articulated, how do we know that the other exists? Naming the 
phenomenon a self-deception seems to imply the existence of an impartial observer, who 
knows the actual reality. This strongly suggests an objectivist perspective on self-deception 
which assumes an opportunity for independent knowledge of things and events. This view 
is incompatible with the position of social constructivists who argue for a 
phenomenologicaly faithful approach to conceptualizing self-deception that privileges the 
perspective of the person experiencing the phenomenon. From this perspective they even 
question the existence of self-deception in principle. 
Notwithstanding these diferences, each approach seems to provide an interesting 
and plausible explanation of self-deception. However, considering that this phenomenon is 
caled self-deception it is surprising to see how litle atention is paid to the self of the self-
deceiver. The examples of self-deception that are usualy discussed give very litle 
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information about the person who is involved in self-deception. The self is somehow 
anonymous and only manifestations of the actual state of self-deception are described. This 
is the gap that needs to be addressed if we wish to help individuals to understand and 
minimize self-deception and help practitioners to influence this intended change. 
3.  Towards a new perspective on self-deception 
3.1. Developmental perspective 
The proposed perspective on self-deception recognizes al conditions for identifying this 
phenomenon, however it suggests an additional one: a consideration of the self of self-
deceivers, or more precisely – the capacities available to this person. Let us consider a 
classical example of people who are ‘ruined’ because of neglecting to look into their states 
of afairs, believing in no problem at al in spite of al signs to the contrary. As usual in the 
description of such cases no information is ofered as to what kind of person is involved in 
this apparent self-deception. Although it is possible to envisage many, let us consider at 
least two. Bob always relied on others to help him out of trouble. He never held his own 
view on issues of importance and avoided making decisions. Neglecting his own afairs 
would only be a slightly amplified state of his ‘normal self’. Peter is fairly independent and 
is usualy responsible for his actions. He is a person for whom neglecting his own afairs 
would be out of character. In this case avoidance of looking into his afairs and imagining 
that everything is in order when it is not, would be a case of self-deception. We could 
easily imagine that one day Peter wil ‘wake up’ and recognize this state as self-deception. 
However, in the case of Bob it is only a hypothetical ‘responsible self’ who is deceived 
rather than the actual ‘self’ and this case strictly speaking is not a case of self-deception. It 
is unlikely that Bob would be able to recognize actions as self-deceptive unless he 
undergoes a significant transformation. 
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However, most of the literature on self-deception tends to consider this phenomenon 
in isolation, as if it can be studied independently of the individual involved. There are only 
fleeting remarks in the accounts of some authors that indicate this problem. For example, 
Darwal (1988,  p.  419) invites a diferent interpretation  of self-deception  depending  on 
individual diferences and certain capabilities: 
To the extent that someone lacks any independent perspective from which criticaly 
to appropriate moral standards and simply identifies them with external demands, we 
are, I think, less likely to think of him as self-deceiving. There wil be the same sort 
of repression and evasive action as the self-deceiver takes, but the person wil seem 
less responsible if  he lacks some independent critical  perspective.  Serious self-
deception … requires a capacity of independent critical thought (p. 419). 
As in the previous example, Bob, according to his stage of development, lacks such an 
independent critical perspective. His evasive actions may look like self-deceptive, but it is 
clear that his developmental level is a more plausible explanation of his behavior than self-
deception. The later implies that the person holds two incompatible beliefs. In this case, 
Bob’s lack of action simply indicates his ignorance or naïve belief that the help wil come 
as it used to. 
The first proposition of the developmental perspective is that individual diferences 
in relation to self-deception do not only indicate the degree to which individuals are 
prone to it, but also play an important role in identifying whether each particular case is a 
case of self-deception. Self-deception can be identified if the individual possesses the 
capacity not to be involved in these particular self-deceptive behaviors but does so 
nevertheless for a particular gain. It is not self-deception if a person does not have such a 
capacity. A second and stronger proposition suggests that for self-deception to be 
recognized as such the person has to have a potential to identify his/her recent 
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perceptions or actions as self-deceptive ‘here and now’ rather than as the result of 
hypothetical transformation. I believe that the above condition for recognizing self-
deception (at least in its first formulation) should be added to the four identified so far in 
the literature. 
Self-deception could be seen as a sign of temporary stepping back from the level of 
achieved development. A range of authors on adult development (e.g. Kegan, 1982, 1994; 
Torbert, 2004; Cook-Greuter, 1999) who folowed in the footsteps of Freud (1938/1957), 
Piaget (1976), Kohlberg (1969), Pery (1970), Graves (1970), Loevinger (1976) and many 
others, developed theories identifying paterns in the development of individuals in relation 
to the cognitive ability, moral reasoning, emotional maturity, ego strength and other 
aspects. According to these theories development of the above capacities is incremental. 
However, temporary signs of regress are not unusual (Adam & Fitch, 1982; Redmore, 
1983; Westenberg & Gjerde, 1999; Manners & Durkin) and in some developmental 
theories potential for this regress is acknowledged suggesting that development is not 
necessarily a steady and linear progress (Cook-Greuter, 1999). It might be possible to 
speculate from what is known so far about self-deception that such instances of ‘stepping 
back’ happen when the need of a previous stage becomes powerfuly activated. That is why 
self-deception is perceived as unusual and something of a ‘betrayal’ of the self. To 
summarize: self-deception consists in perceptual flaws and the behavior that perpetuates 
them, uncharacteristic for the achieved level of the individual’s development. 
A developmental perspective can provide a unique explanation about the kind of 
capacity that would alow or prevent an individual from noticing her own self-deception. In 
relation to cognitive capacity, for example, we would not cal a child self-deceiver if she 
covers her head with a blanket and believes that nobody can see her. However, if this 
‘trick’ is performed by a teenager it would probably qualify as such. According to various 
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developmental theories which extend Piaget’s (1976) model of cognitive development to 
adults (e.g. Pery, 1970; Kohlberg, 1969; King and Kitchener, 1994), the cognitive 
capacities of adults are also in the process of development from features such as basic 
duality in thinking to contextual relativism. Therefore, self-deception manifested for 
example in ‘black and white’ thinking would be suspected if the person demonstrating it is 
normaly capable of thinking in a more nuanced and abstract way with an appreciation of 
the ambiguity of concepts and the role of context. What would confirm this case as self-
deception is a clear motive implicating that the person might benefit from seeing things in a 
‘black and white’ way. At the same time this type of seeing things would be a normal way 
of thinking for another person with or without particular ‘benefits’. This second person 
does not deceive herself when her self does not yet include these higher capacities 
(Bachkirova, 2013). 
A more useful concept for explaining self-deception from the developmental 
perspective is the development of the self or ego-development which postulates the stages 
in the development of the self or self-identity (Loevinger, 1976; Kegan, 1982; Cook-
Greuter, 1999). One such mechanism described by Kegan (1982) as ‘Subject-Object’ 
relation is particularly useful. Things that are Subjects are in this theory experienced by the 
individual as unquestioned. He or she cannot stand back and reflect on them, as they are 
simply part of the self. For example, some cultural norms and expectations are often 
Subject to people; they constitute the framework through which individuals comprehend 
the situation until they are able to make them an Object and explore and reflect on them. 
The more individuals can take as Object the more complex their worldview becomes. 
Kegan (1982) suggests that the shift from Subject to Object happens in relation to some 
important elements of the self, thus indicating a stage in their development. For example, at 
one of the developmental stages, relationships with others is Subject to them; they cannot 
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diferentiate themselves from important relationships and do not know who they are 
outside of the expectations of others. At a folowing stage their relationship becomes 
Object and they become capable of being a self with a sense of autonomy. 
The distinction between the above stages of development is useful in identifying 
self-deception. Let us consider an example of a woman in a controling and abusive 
relationship believing her partner that the abuse is her own fault. She hopes for a positive 
change with the only evidence being to the contrary. In the case of Emma this should not 
be considered as self-deception. She simply did not develop a sense of self separate from 
her important relationship. Her view of herself depends on the expectation of the important 
other and she sees this situation through her need to belong. She would be prone to similar 
beliefs and would act accordingly in other important relationships. Karina, on the other 
hand, is her own person and has the ability to see herself outside the relationship. Her 
explanation for believing her partner is rationalized as her responsibility for the situation 
and her belief that she can make it work. She lies to herself that it is geting beter. Deeper 
stil, may be her fear of conflict or of the prospect of being alone which is associated with a 
need that is more characteristic of the previous stage of development. Karina’s ‘not 
noticing’ of the worsening of the situation is self-deception as ‘she could see it if only she 
would’ (Fingarete, 2000). 
The above diferentiation maters for practical reasons. An experienced therapist or 
coach would work diferently with Emma and Karina. They would try to help Emma to 
develop her own view on the situation. It would most likely be a long-term process, which 
would include providing for Emma a warm and supportive relationship and helping her to 
develop her sense of self that is independent of others. This would hopefuly lead to the 
development of her stronger self, the self that can see her relationship as Object and 
examine it. With Karina it would be possible to chalenge her exaggerated sense of 
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responsibility for something that is beyond her control. With her ego strength the 
practitioners may decide to initiate a deeper inquiry sooner than later. She could recognize 
her fears as a source of self-deception and identify other strengths that could help her in 
this situation. 
3.2. Implications of the developmental perspective 
In terms of the implications of the developmental perspective for those who wish to 
minimize self-deception, the above examples show the need for the individual approach in 
identifying and addressing self-deception. Some individual diferences may be trait-like 
self-deceptive tendencies indicating a personality type as in cases such as narcissism. This 
could be seen as a horizontal dimension of individual diference in self-deception and, as 
personality theories suggest, these tendencies are persistent and very dificult to influence. 
A vertical dimension of individual diferences on the other hand indicates that the 
developmental stage of al individuals could give a diferent type of insight into their self-
deception and indicate an individual approach to addressing it. 
Another way to minimize self-deception would be to invest psychologicaly in 
further development of the organism as a whole in terms of al its engagements with the 
world. Research shows that with each level of development self-deception becomes less 
dramatic, more noticeable and has lighter consequences (Vailant, 1992; Cook-Greuter, 
1999). In a similar way there are specific potential strategies that may be useful for 
improving quality of perception in principle which Claxton cals ‘perceptual re-education’ 
(1994, p. 11). As a diferent strategy for personal development, simply understanding the 
nature of the organism and self-deception and developing beter self-observation skils may 
increase awareness and contribute to a more appropriate atitude to oneself with lesser need 
for self-deception. 
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The pragmatic and developmental focus of this inquiry provides an opportunity for 
a theoretical contribution to understanding the phenomenon of self-deception. If the 
presented approaches to self-deception are seen as perspectives or diferent lenses on this 
phenomenon it is possible to utilize the insight they provide and to arive at their synthesis: 
a conceptual model that alows a multidimensional view on self-deception (Fig 1). 
 
 
 
This model suggests that the discussed approaches to self-deception address it at diferent 
levels: the biological level of the individual brain structure and functioning of the 
organism in the evolutionary terms; the psychological level of individual diferences and 
the cultural level that implies diferent conceptions of truth, self and self-knowledge. 
Such an approach assumes the complexity of this phenomenon without an atempt to 
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Figure	1			Levels	of	explanation	of	self-deception	according	to	diverse	
perspectives	 
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reduce it to a one-dimensional explanation. The theories of self-deception on each of 
these levels add a particular facet to understanding self-deception without necessarily 
undermining another. 
For example, on the biological level of the individual brain structure a 
developmental perspective on self-deception does not preclude us from conceptualizing the 
self as modular, which makes a convincing explanation of self-deception in terms of the 
mechanisms for coexisting contradictory beliefs. In the working of a ‘modular self’ as 
many modules perform many functions in the process of engagement with the environment 
some of them may strategicaly prevent other modules’ access to particular information in 
order to sustain advantage in some situations. The overal capacity of this modular system 
is determined by the quality of each module performance. Self-deception could be seen as 
blind spots in perception and consequent behavior caused by a temporary dominance of 
some modules over others. At the same time, it is possible to speculate that there are 
modules responsible for evaluating the performance of the whole system that is gradualy 
becoming more eficient. Through efective self-observation they might alow awareness of 
the conflict when one module occupies center stage and takes over other modules. It is 
these modules that may be able to recognize the filters of self-deception. These modules 
may also be responsible when individuals experience a sense of disappointment and 
concern identifying their self-deceptive tendencies and want to minimize them. 
On the biological level the evolutionary perspective provides a plausible 
explanation for the power of sustained reproductive mechanisms for fitness that may 
encourage tendencies for self-deception. Although it is reasonable to assume that 
competitiveness for sexual conquest and status that drives deception and self-deception 
might become comparatively less prominent at later stages of life, the mechanisms 
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described by evolutionary approach create an important background to this phenomenon 
for interested practitioners. 
The psychological level of this framework emphasizes manifestations of the above 
mechanisms in the anomalies of perception and actions that are usualy discussed as self-
deception. This paper suggests that an understanding of self-deception as a psychological 
phenomenon requires consideration of individual diferences that can be seen from two 
perspectives: horizontal (personality theories perspective) or vertical (developmental 
perspective). The developmental perspective also suggests that other traditions of working 
with self-deception may have an advantage when dealing with individuals at diferent 
stages of development. For example, it seems reasonable to assume that psychodynamic 
traditions would have more appropriate strategies for those whose dominant concern is 
self-preservation and who demonstrate classical defense mechanisms such as denial or 
repression. Existential therapy and coaching on the other hand may be more efective for 
those with a higher level of awareness of their own role in their self-deceptive tendencies. 
On the cultural level of this model, postmodernism ofers what could be seen as 
a chalenging perspective to other traditions by questioning the existence of self-
deception in principle. In the culturaly dominant paradigm with an orientation to 
absolute truth this chalenge is wel justified. The assumption that the side of the story 
that is hidden in self-deception is verifiable and true needs to be questioned and 
cannot become a condition for the identification of self-deception. From the 
developmental perspective individuals are in the process of change in the way they 
see and understand themselves and their world; individuals’ understanding and 
experience of reality is viewed as a construction of their minds, taking the form of 
a narrative that typifies the way the person makes sense and meaning from their 
experience. By implication, a narative is limited in content. It contains what is most 
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meaningful for its creator, but necessarily leaves out elements of experience that pass 
unnoticed. Thus immersion in one narative may lead to something missed out of 
another, potentialy created by a diferent module from the micro-level perspective. It 
is also important to emphasize that in certain circumstances some naratives can be 
verified thus questioning in turn the absolutism of the postmodernist perspective 
itself. 
It is interesting that both the biological level and the cultural level, considered on 
their own, can be seen as a justification of self-deception and thus opposite to the 
intention of this paper. However, they could be useful for those individuals interested in 
self-development and the practitioners assisting them. As part of the proposed conceptual 
model, understanding these perspectives creates a rich and multidimensional picture of 
this phenomenon that can help to develop a systemic view on this phenomenon with the 
added depth of contextual factors such as culture, evolution and the structure of the brain. 
The complexity of self-deception as presented in this model highlights that the clear-cut 
definition of it is an unresolved issue; because of such complexity, definition of this 
concept remains elusive. It is possible that self-deception could only be identified and 
addressed with the consideration of many factors and observations about individuals in 
their developmental processes and various contexts. However, the realization of such 
complexity may also encourage individuals themselves, therapists and coaches to 
approach it with compassion and curiosity rather than with disapproval and concern. 
4.  Conclusion 
It seems undeniable that the concept of self-deception is meaningful for individuals. People 
are able to recognize these experiences retrospectively and usualy do not want to deceive 
themselves. The realization of being involved in self-deception is often a strong stimulus 
for personal development and potentialy – for wider social change. This paper explored 
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the concept of self-deception and several distinct theoretical perspectives with their 
potential value for individuals who wish to deceive themselves less and for ‘helping’ 
practitioners. A new proposed perspective highlighted a developmental aspect of individual 
diferences indicating useful avenues for practitioners to explore in their work. 
For a pragmatist, this inquiry also provided an opportunity to create a unique 
synthesis of the explanations of self-deception. This new developmentaly informed 
explanation of self-deception helps to account for many aspects of the complexity and 
multifaceted nature of self-deception with the added value of other perspectives. In addition 
to extending our understanding of this phenomenon it can rejuvenate the interest of 
researchers in self-deception and suggest exploration of new meaningful questions. 
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